How much can we really tell from claims about Hormuz warnings?

Those are two separate questions. Iran’s ability to threaten or disrupt shipping through the strait is a longstanding strategic risk. That does not, by itself, show whether a particular adviser raised it, whether the warning reached the president, or how it was weighed.

To support the claim about the advisers, you would need evidence such as contemporaneous briefings, official records, or credible reporting about the decision process. Without that, “nobody warned him” is speculation, not something established by the risk alone.

The risk is serious, but “weaponize” can make it sound like Iran could shut the route down cleanly and without consequences. Threatening or disrupting traffic is different from maintaining a complete closure. A crisis there could affect shipping and energy markets, while also provoking a major response and harming Iran’s own interests.

So I’d frame it as a dangerous vulnerability, not a simple switch that one side can flip at no cost.

Even if a warning was given, that doesn’t mean it changed the decision. Advisers can lay out risks and still be ignored, or leaders can accept a risk because they think the expected gain is worth it. The useful question is what was presented, what options were discussed, and what the decision-maker chose to do with that information.